Showing posts with label NPF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NPF. Show all posts

Labour's Economic Policy: Are We There Yet?

After a severe drought, new policies were showered on the Labour Party conference in September. Both the leader and his shadow chancellor made significant announcements. But does it yet add up to a coherent economic policy? Or can we at least see the outlines of an approach or an economic philosophy?

In trying to answer the questions, I find two immediate difficulties. Firstly, few of the policies are actually new. Secondly, where there are changes, they reflect political positioning rather than economic analysis.

The conference welcomed the reforms to employment rights which will see worker protection strengthened and crucially sectoral pay bargaining expanded. Support for the green new deal comes with an interventionist industrial policy to substitute imported technology with home grown windmills, batteries, electric vehicles and so on. All of which is consistent with recent manifestos.

Other policies announced include rules to ensure fiscal discipline and a target for R&D spending. Outsourcing will be curtailed with a promise of “insourcing” at an unprecedented scale. Rachel Reeves’s fiscal rules are identical to those advanced by John Mc Donnell as shadow chancellor. (Anneliese Dodd had proposed to update them, post Covid, but we seem to be back to the 2017 rules). Insourcing of public services is another idea that sounded radical when John Mc Donnell launched it some years back.

The target of 3% of national income spent on R&D has been government policy for 20 years. Indeed, the Blair government wrote it into a European agreement, the Lisbon Agenda, in 2000 and it was maintained in its successor programme, Europe 2020

Genuinely new are the reform of business rates and the duty of long-termism imposed on company directors, A new body will be created to oversee value for money in public spending, which sounds new but I thought that was already the job of the National Audit Office.

The shock rejection of nationalisation seems to have less to do with effective policy than political signalling. New Labour saw nationalisation as toxic to their brand and were reluctant to use it, even when it became inevitable during the global financial crisis. Sir Kier is signalling a break from the recent past. However, he does not offer an alternative to fix the broken system introduced by privatisation. Poll after poll shows that nationalisation is popular. It is not just economists who have noticed that privatisation has failed but customers as well.

Alongside the holdovers from past manifestos, there are other signs that Starmeromics is not a return to the neoliberalism of the 1990s or the austerity of the naughties. Rachel Reeves’s focus on “the everyday economy” and the shift to sectoral bargaining reflects a rejection of the idea that wages can be set in the “labour market”. Green industrial policy also reclaims power from the market. Indeed, it overturns the liberal idea of free trade. If government will sponsor the development of domestic industries to supplant imports, then trade is no longer free.

However, its radicalism is combined with a “business friendly” framing. Business lobbies have left a mark on the policies on business rates and corporate governance. The business friendly idea is ambiguous and fraught with political risks. For example, most business think a friendly policy would be tax cuts.

Another problem with business friendly policy is that businesses are meant to be in competition. So which businesses are we going to be friendly with? The abolition of business rates is popular with SMEs, not so much tech giants. The change to directors’ duties will please productive companies more than financial companies and industrial policies will favour manufacturing over trading businesses.

Labour does not yet have a coherent economic strategy. In particular, Sir Kier will need to be careful not to let signalling trump effective policy. He will need to exercise caution in dealing with business where the same policy will make a friend of one but an enemy of another.

 

National Policy Forum consultation 2020

The NPF has launched it consultation exercise for 2020. It is inviting submissions until the end of June. Submissions should be posted to policyforum.labour.org.uk.

There are eight priority topics all of which relate to the impact of Covid-19. I am providing a link here to each of the documents in PDF format.










Labour's Brexit Policy

As part of my role on the NPF, I study the submissions made by members and others to the policy commission on which I sit, Economy, Business and Trade. Quite a few of these relate to Brexit, although a different commission actually has the lead on that topic.

I find that many of the submissions are unsure of where Labour stands and it helps to have this statement of policy which was adopted by the Party conference in September 2017. Unfortunately, I can't find it on the web so I'm posting it here.

NEC Statement on Brexit 25 September 2017

CLP Influence on the Manifesto

Labour's manifesto was one of the stars of the 2017 election. I read over the document to see what signs I could find that Labour International, my CLP, had had on the policy-making process that had led to the manifesto.

I found quite a few places where our ideas had been taken up and reported back through the LI website:

http://www.labourinternational.net/labour_international_influence_on_the_manifesto

It's the Demand Side Stupid

During the General Election it was clear that Labour's radical manifesto was one of the major factors driving the campaign. The Labour Party set out a credible alternative to continuing austerity in a document that offered hope to the many.

I felt that the economic case against austerity needed to be made more fully. I wrote a short article which drew on my experience on the  economy commission of the NPF, to argue that we needed to explain the importance of the demand side. It was published on 30 May 2017 on Left Foot Forward:

The Tory economic strategy can only fail – Labour must do more to make that clear


This election campaign has been unusual in many respects, yet one peculiarity stands out. In contrast to recent elections, the economy has barely featured as an issue.

Labour has done an excellent job of turning the agenda away from Brexit and has had success with the double launch of its manifesto. Whether accidental or intended, the leak allowed a focus on the policies to revive public services while the official launch gave an opportunity to establish a strong, credible fiscal stance.

The attention paid to fiscal policy was a defensive move intended to address a potential weakness. Excellent handling of the issue has persuasively demonstrated that there is an alternative to austerity. However, tax and spend is not economic policy and Labour has a position on future prosperity which will be effective, which is different from the Tories and which deserves to be sold in the later stages of the election.

A key plank of Labour’s economic strategy is investment. The manifesto promises a National Transformation Fund to invest £250 billion over ten years on improving infrastructure. Private sector investment will be facilitated by a National Investment Bank supported by a network of Regional Development Banks. Labour’s industrial strategy will give direction to private investment through a mission oriented approach to address the challenges of the future and pushing Britain towards the technological frontier.

By contrast, the Tory path offers yet more austerity, with a continuation of the low wages and low investment that has held Britain’s economy back.

Labour hasn’t yet done enough to explain why the Tory economic strategy failed and could only fail. The explanation lies on the demand side. Suppressing wages, low public investment and poor private investment weigh on demand and lead to low growth. The main source sustaining demand in recent years has been household spending financed by credit. That is unsustainable. Household indebtedness cannot rise forever and will sooner or later end catastrophically.

Labour’s path boosts demand by infrastructure investment, private sector investment and allowing wages to rise. The distinction between Labour’s economic policy and the Tory programme is most evident when we look from a demand side perspective.

It is possible to argue Labour’s case from the supply side. The investment focus not only sustains demand in the short term but provides for sustained growth in prosperity in the long run. Public infrastructure helps firms to be more productive and private investment drives increasing productivity of labour. In contrast to the unsustainable demand based on household debt an investment based strategy provides the continual increase in productivity which pays for higher wages.

After decades when Keynes was neglected and supply side policy dominated political discourse, it may be tempting to frame the issue this way. However, while technically correct, the supply side argument fails to explain of why wage control and cuts do not lead to a healthy economy.

Labour made a strong start to the campaign when it accused the Conservative government of ‘holding back Britain’. In the closing stages of the campaign, we need to see the detail of why their polices are a drag on the economy and how Labour offers a distinct alternative.

Labour’s pitch in this election should have two elements. The first is the traditional strength in rebuilding public services, from health and social care to policing and prisons. The second is a new approach to the economy where government acts to sustain investment and keep the economy moving.

The demand side argument makes clear why ending austerity is good economics.

Labour's Economic Policy Commission

I've been appointed to the Economic Policy Commission as part of my work on Labour's National Policy Forum. The Commission held its first meeting in Westminster in January.

Here is the report I wrote for the CLP:
http://www.labourinternational.net/policy_commission_on_the_economy_gets_down_to_work

Lessons of Landsbanki

Below is an extract from the submission I made to the National Policy Forum in October concerning the issue of "passporting" financial services. The story of Landsbanki explains why the Financial Services Authority concluded that,
 “Existing single market rules can create unacceptable risks to depositors or to taxpayers”.

Lessons of Landsbanki
In his memoir former Chancellor, Alistair Darling describes Landsbanki in 2008 as “a disaster waiting to happen. ...all the action was in London but the regulation and detailed supervision of what was going on was supposed to be carried out over a thousand miles away in Iceland.”[1] The FSA had alerted the Chancellor of their concerns about Landsbanki and Haupthing, another Icelandic bank operating in London. At their prompting he held meetings with an Icelandic government delegation and later spoke directly to the country’s Prime Minister. The passporting arrangement meant that the UK authorities could do little more than put pressure on Iceland over Landsbanki. [2]
Landsbanki failed in October 2008 by which time its online Icesave accounts held £4.6 billion in UK deposits from 230,000 British customers.
In theory Icesave customers were protected by a deposit guarantee scheme. Iceland guaranteed only the first €21,000 (about £17,000) of each depositor’s funds and Landsbanki had voluntarily joined the UK’s deposit insurance scheme which topped this sum up to £50,000.Unfortunately the government of Iceland was unable to honour this guarantee.
The UK government intervened. Firstly the bank’s UK assets were seized using powers originally intended to deal with money laundering by terrorist organisations. To avoid further loss of confidence in the banking system the Chancellor of the Exchequer insisted that depositors should be repaid in full.
The funds paid in compensation to Icesave customers by the British government were treated as a loan which Iceland needed to repay. The UK launched prolonged legal and diplomatic challenges to recover the money. The final instalment was eventually handed over in January 2016.[3]
Iceland had a population of 318,500 in 2009 and GDP of €2.2 billion[4] yet Iceland’s taxpayers were expected to pay compensation to UK savers amounting to £4.6 billion. To make matters worse the Krona was steeply devalued by Iceland’s crisis.


The full text of my submission is available here.


[1] Alistair Darling, Back from the Brink: 1000 days at number 11, Atlantic Books, 2011. p147
[2] See also The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis, FSA, 2009.p38
[3] Financial Times, 15 January, 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/3ec13e4c-bbaa-11e5-b151-8e15c9a029fb
[4] Eurostat